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Invention of the ancient art of memory (AAOM) is attributed to
Greek poet Simonides of Ceos (556–468 BCE), who developed
the method of loci (MoL; Fig. 1) after purportedly identifying
the remains of comrades crushed in a temple collapse solely
from his memory of where they were sitting before he fortuitously
left the building. The MoL became common in Greek oral tra-
ditions and remains among the most effective mnemonic tech-
niques (Massen et al. 2009; Verhaeghen & Kliegl 2000). The
MoL facilitates memory for both abstract and concrete material
(Wang & Thomas 2000), is especially effective with serially
ordered material (e.g., episodic memories) and is most effective
when the imagined pathways used are self-generated versus
other-generated (Bellezza & Reddy 1978). It is a favored tech-
nique of mnemonists, as shown in a study of highly trained sub-
jects, 90% of whom spontaneously used the MoL to complete
study tasks (Maguire et al. 2003). Some findings even suggest
that the MoL is effective without using bizarre or atypical compo-
site imagery; the latter have no effect on memory if the imagery
employed is sufficiently concrete, lively, and emotional (Persensky
& Senter 1970; Senter & Hoffman 1976).
Given the centrality of the MoL technique to memory enhance-
ment, a critical question for Llewellyn’s hypothesis is: Does
dreaming portray coherently ordered, familiar locations like
those required for the MoL?
Evidence supports the view that it does not, that dream
locations are neither familiar nor coherently ordered. First, sub-
jects rate dream locations as familiar only infrequently. In one
study (119 dreams, 331 locations), they indicated that only
35.5% of dream locations were either exact or slightly modified
replications of previously experienced locations (Dorus et al.
1971). This value is lower than for characters (51.7%) or activi-
ties/interactions (39.1%) but parallels the 33.7% of dream settings
that subjects in a normative study (N = 200) described as familiar
(Hall & van de Castle 1966). The latter value is an overestimate
because familiarity scoring included famous settings that subjects
may never have visited. Accordingly, another study estimates that
familiar settings are the least frequent episodic memory element
(17%) that subjects link to their dreams; less frequent even than
themes, emotions, characters, or actions (Fosse et al. 2003).
Second, a lack of location ordering is suggested by the finding
that dream locations are clearly the most frequent temporally dis-
continuous element (12.8%); they suddenly and unexpectedly
appear, disappear, or transform (Revonsuo & Salmivalli 1995).
Other elements, such as persons, objects, or actions, are discon-
tinuous only 1.5%–4.8% of the time. A second study (Rittenhouse
et al. 1994) found discontinuities of location (10%) to be second
only to discontinuities of plot (14%). Beyond such apparent
discontinuity, however, successive dream locations may not be
linked in any coherent sense (see example below). A dream prota-
gonist might traverse several locations that are not logically con-
nected and yet not notice this discontinuity.
Thus, the relative paucity of location familiarity and coherent
ordering does not necessarily entail that dreams themselves are
incoherent, but only that their coherence may be based on
other qualities, such as emotion, narrative structure, or protago-
nist activity. Ambulatory motor activity, in particular, is prevalent
in dream content (McCarley & Hobson 1977) and sustains a sense
of story continuity, even though the scenes through which move-
ment occurs change frequently and unexpectedly. For example,
one short dream (Hobson & McCarley 1977) illustrating continu-
ous motor activity also belies an absence of location continuity; in
quick succession the dreamer reported: “sitting in front of a
piano,” “walking around an amusement park,” “watching a
band,” “walking up some steps,” “near rocks in the water,” and
“filling a hole up with marble slabs” (p. 117). This array seems
too disparate and incoherent to support MoL-like memory
enhancement.
It could be argued that since even fictitious MoL locations are
mnemonically effective (Yates 1966), so too are the novel, ficti-
tious locations of dreams. In fact, fictitious “virtual environments”
are as effective for improving memory as is a standard, familiar
MoL setting (Legge et al. 2012). However, the latter finding
was for stimuli that were encoded immediately after exposure to
the virtual environment, when memory for the environment had
not yet dissipated. No testing of longer-term consolidation was
undertaken, and it is doubtful that it could have occurred if the
virtual environments were not also committed to memory as
required by the MoL. Dream settings, though perhaps similarly
“virtual,” are also not typically highly memorized.
It could also be argued that MoL familiarity and coherence
requirements need not be based upon geographic or architectural
locations to be effective. As Llewellyn’s “lawsuit” example illus-
trates, a well-structured tableau containing very closely spaced
locations may be effective; dream imagery may be much like
this. Note, however, that such closely spaced MoL landmarks
are less effective than are distantly spaced landmarks, such as
one’s route to work (Massen et al. 2009). Nonetheless, this argu-
ment implies that dream locations may be irrelevant to dreaming’s
memory function; the essential ingredient may be the formation
of composite dream images.
In conclusion, research on the question of dreaming’s MoL-like
quality suggests that dreams do not fulfill certain basic require-
ments; locations are neither familiar nor coherently ordered and
thus may not facilitate episodic memory. This conclusion dovetails
with most, but not all (cf. Griessenberger et al. 2012; Rauchs et al.
2004) evidence that either sleep does not consolidate episodic
memory (Aly & Moscovitch 2010; Inostroza et al. 2013) or that
episodic memory depends upon non–rapid eye movement
(NREM), rather than REM, sleep (Daurat et al. 2007; Drosopou-
los et al. 2005; Scullin 2012; van der Helm et al. 2011a).
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Abstract: According to the tuning-for-criticality theory, the essential role
of sleep is to protect the brain from super-critical behaviour. Here we
Figure 1 (Nielsen). Encoding of an episodic memory with the
classical method of loci technique. The individual draws upon
(A) a familiar sequence of locations, such as a building or path
with a known order. To each unique location, the individual
associates (B) a distinctive compositional image that substitutes
for (C) a component of the to-be-remembered episode. To
recall the memory, the individual mentally “revisits” the
locations and “retrieves” the image/component “placed” there.
Because the location sequence is familiar, images linked to it
can be accessed in any order. Distinctiveness of the
compositional images derives from, for example, their visual
vividness, bizarreness, or emotion. Dream imagery only rarely
depicts familiar, coherently ordered sequences of locations but
may at times fulfill the requirement of distinctiveness (see the
text).
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argue that this protective role determines the content of dreams and any
apparent relationship to the art of memory is secondary to this.
It is widely believed that memory consolidation is the purpose of
sleep. However, as detailed in the target article, the description of
this process that emerges from experiment is confusing and
complex. Mindful that complex phenomenology is commonly
the attribute of a secondary purpose, we proposed (Pearlmutter
& Houghton 2009) that sleep has a different primary purpose –
tuning for criticality – and that the link with memory consolidation
is secondary. Memory consolidation may occur during sleep, it
may even occur preferentially during sleep, but it is not the essen-
tial purpose of sleep.
The obvious goals of learning, rapid responses to stimuli, and pro-
longed retention of short-term memories are, from a network
dynamics point of view, attributes of near-critical systems. Thus, it
is likely that, during learning, neuronal circuits become increasingly
critical and approach super-critical behaviour – behaviour that
would involve runaway oscillations and constitute a pathological dis-
ruption of normal brain function. Thus, the optimisation of behav-
iour during learning requires a mechanism for preventing the
brain from straying into a parameter region where it could be stimu-
lated into pathological oscillations, and learning can occur only if
there is a margin of safety around the current state of the brain.
In the tuning-for-criticality theory the purpose of sleep is to
establish this margin of error. Thus, during sleep there is a synap-
tic plasticity regime which is different from the one which sup-
ports learning during wakefulness, and this works to move the
brain away from criticality. In this way the sleep-work cycle
tunes the brain so that it is close to criticality and optimised to
respond to likely stimuli, but safe from the uncontrolled behaviour
associated with super-criticality.
According to this proposal, the role of dreams is to stimulate the
brain in a manner that mimics awake cognition as part of a search
for self-reinforcing loops. Dreams are therefore a guess, based on
recent and distant memories, of possible future stimuli. The target
article describes the attributes of dreams. Dreams are emotionally
salient and sometimes shocking or disgusting, they are associated
with pontine-geniculate-occipital waves, they are narrative but the
narrative is fragmentary, they contain incongruities, and the iden-
tities of people in them are often fused or indeterminate. Dreams
are largely visual, with snatches of auditory sensation but almost
no olfactory, gustatory, or tactile content. They are often charac-
terised by the illusion of movement and spatial navigation. The
target article points to this as a congruence between the form of
the classic mnemonic and dreams, though it does not elaborate
on what cognitive or biochemical mechanism related to this con-
gruence would act to improve the efficacy of the mnemonic. We
contend, however, that these are all attributes which dreams
might be expected to have if they are a mechanism the brain
uses to cast around for neuronal circuits in which potential
stimuli could evoke runaway oscillations.
Pontine-geniculate-occipital waves arise only in wakefulness in
response to unexpected events and are believed to focus attention,
heightening responses. Emotionally salient, disgusting, and shock-
ing dream content is likely to provoke stronger neuronal
responses. Because the brain responds to temporally integrated
stimuli, the exploratory simulated environment produced by
dreams needs a narrative structure, but for this purpose, the nar-
rative may be fragmented and discontinuous. The dream world
need not be wholly specific; fused and indeterminate aspects of
dream content seem unlikely to reduce its capacity to evoke
responses indicative of potentially harmful self-reinforcing loops.
The visual, auditory, and ambulatory character of dreams reflects
the timescales and stimulus types most pertinent to everyday
learning and common threats. In short, the nature of dream
content is consistent with a tuning-for-criticality function of
sleep. The pertinence of dream content means that similar
content is likely to be memorable and this might explain the
utility of this type of content in mnemonics.
Learning for behavioural optimisation is a key objective of
cognition and content salient to this objective is likely to be
both memorable and provocative. It may be this, rather than a
direct functional link, that relates the art of memory and the
nature of dreams. Alternatively, we might speculate that the
random activity involved in dreaming first evolved to avoid criti-
cality and that the availability of random narratives based partly
on recent memories encouraged the development of learning
strategies which make strong use of these narratives through a
sort of hashing algorithm. In this light, we would view mnemonic
consolidation as a particularly apt secondary purpose of sleep, in
that it makes use not only of physical quiescence but also exploits
the computational processes already present in tuning for criticality.
Mnemonic consolidation may avoid waste by utilizing the
dream content that was generated, at some metabolic expense,
to locate potentially super-critical neuronal circuits. However,
we believe that there is no evidence to suggest that memory
processes like consolidation and mnemonic association can
occur only during sleep. Sleep is such an extreme and hazardous
adaptation it seems unlikely it evolved to serve a function, like
mnemonic association, that could also be performed while awake.
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Abstract: Toward illuminating the structure of Llewellyn’s dream theory,
I compare it in formal terms to Freud’s dream theory. An alternative to
both of these dream machines, grounded in the distribution of
cholinergic activation in the central nervous system, is presented. It is
suggested that neither “high” nor “low” dream theory is sufficient to
account for the properties of dreams.
Llewellyn’s is an attractive hypothesis, engagingly presented. In
structure – not, of course, in substance – it is like Freud’s dream
theory. Freud’s dream machine exercises a set of operations –
the components of the dream work – that, when applied uncon-
sciously in waking, produce a neurotic symptom. Llewellyn’s
dream machine exercises a set of operations – the components
of the ancient art of memory (AAOM) – that, when applied delib-
erately in waking, elaboratively encode an episodic memory.
Both dream generators account ingeniously for the peculiarities
of dream experience, and both achieve an explicit aim. By conden-
sation, displacement, “consideration of representability,” and sec-
ondary revision, a Freudian dream expresses a forbidden Oedipal
wish (Freud 1900/1981). A Llewellynian dream – by association,
organization, narration, embodiment, movement, and location –
encodes the to-be-remembered material. In both cases the
latent dream is obscured – in Freud’s model by cunning, in
order to evade the “psychic censorship,” and in Llewellyn’s (she
has no use for a calculating homunculus) by guileless neural pro-
cesses, in order to realize what I shall call the AAOM-in-REM.
These formal likenesses entail another. Against the school of
“bottom-up” dream construction, Llewellyn’s theory, like
Freud’s, is a “high” theory: an explicitly “top-down” machine.
What if – both on the neural axis and in regard to imaginative
complexity – dreaming is neither a “high” nor a “low” process,
but an egalitarian one? A case in point is what might be called Lle-
wellyn’s telencephalocentric treatment of levels of acetylcholine
(ACh) in waking and in sleep. Table 1 lists and describes the
main cholinergic neural groups in the central nervous system. It
is fair to ask, can the AAOM-in-REM accommodate the realities
of ACh-in-REM, from hindbrain to forebrain? (In Table 1, cell
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